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The contention of this article is that parents have an obligation to care for their children,
but for reasons that are not typically offered. I argue that this obligation can be unfair
to parents but not unjust. I do not provide an account of what our specific obligations are
to our children. Rather, I focus on providing a justification for any obligation to care for
them at all. My argument turns on providing an external description of the parent–child
relationship in order to establish that parents are in a unique position among adults in
their ability to help and harm their own children. Given that children are deserving of
moral regard, I conclude that parents are obligated – in a way that is often unfair – to
provide this care. I end by considering implications for social policy.
What is best for a human is not necessarily being a parent. But it is best
for humans to have a parent, and best to be parented for many years of
one’s life. So there is a conflict: there is a relationship that is best for
some humans, but not for others, and both of these groups are deserving
of moral regard. The common-sense view is that one obviously has an
obligation to care for one’s children or to ensure that another cares for
them, except in the most unusual of circumstances. This is the case even
though our obligations to our children often seem to be far and away
the most demanding. The degree of sacrifice that is required to care for
children is greater than the sacrifice for meeting any other associative
obligation. In most circumstances, the kind of obligation undertaken is
also the most life-altering among the associative obligations.1
Consider a hard case: tens of thousands of Tutsi women were raped
during the Rwandan genocide. Many of these women became pregnant.
Safe abortion was difficult to come by (abortion was illegal in Rwanda),
and leaving the babies in an orphanage promised a particularly grim
future for them. Approximately 20,000 children were born due to rape
after the genocide.2 Many of the mothers had other children to care
for and were in the acutely difficult position of having lost many of
their family members, including the fathers of their prior children, to
1 I take heed of the clause ‘in most circumstances’. Sometimes, obligations to friends,
neighbors or fellow citizens are undeniably intense and life-altering (e.g. in wartime), and
some obligations to other family members are more demanding (e.g. in the case of a family
member who needs long-term care for a protracted illness or disability). Nevertheless,
we typically provide more care, more intensively, and for a longer period for our children
than for anyone else in our lives.
2 See, Jonathan Torgovnik, Intended Consequences: Rwandan Children Born of Rape
(New York, 2009).
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the genocide as well. The idea is to consider the possibility that in
this scenario the mothers are still the persons best situated to care
for those children. On the other hand, the difficulty of caring for those
children greatly outstrips the difficulty of caring for a child born in less
arduous circumstances. It strains plausibility to think that a mother
has an obligation in such a circumstance, and it is not beyond reason
to accept abandonment as a morally permissible choice. The child, who
is deserving of moral regard, could be best cared for by his mother;
however, caring for the child is at great odds with the mother’s well-
being and integrity. The consequences for the mother are dim if she
accepts the obligation, and the consequences for the child are perhaps
even dimmer if she does not. These kinds of cases illustrate the need
for a compelling argument in favor of parental obligation – that is, it
ought not to be assumed that such an obligation is accepted freely or is
somehow part of the nature of parents to accept. If such an argument
is successful, it should provide a general justification for the obligation
that most parents have to care for their children.
While parental obligation is profoundly different from all other
obligations we have, it is assumed to be the least in need of argument.
It has been the rare philosopher who has doubted whether caring for
children is actually good for parents and children alike. The contention
of this article is that parents do have obligations to care for their
children, but for reasons that are not typically offered. I will argue that
this obligation to care for one’s children can be unfair to parents but
not unjust. In what follows, I will not provide a detailed account of what
our obligations are to our children. Rather, I will focus on providing a
justification for any obligation to care for them at all.
I. DO PARENTS HAVE SPECIAL OBLIGATIONS
TO THEIR CHILDREN?
In certain relationships our obligations to others are thought to
increase. Obligations in these special relationships are sometimes
called associative obligations. Dworkin3 cites as examples of such
relationships those that we have with neighbors, co-workers in a union,
fellow citizens, friends, siblings, parents and children. He argues that
we come to have these associative obligations even when we do not
explicitly accept them. Instead, he characterizes attitudes that a group
may have that result in these obligations in the absence of their
explicit acceptance. Defenses of associative obligations raise a number
of philosophical problems, including: the nature of the obligation
generally, the necessity of voluntariness or explicit acceptance and
3 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge, MA, 1986).
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whether the obligation can be incurred for ‘bare’ (e.g. biological) rather
than ‘substantive’ reasons (e.g. based on relationships). Further, there
is reason to doubt that a single argument in favor of associative
obligations will be able to cover relationships as varied in kind and
degree as those listed above. Here, my narrow concern is with a specific
associative obligation – that of a parent toward his child.
Humans are the kinds of creatures that are dependent for many
years. Without someone to care for them, human children are unlikely
to survive. Yet, even if we accept that someone ought to care for children
in order to ensure their survival, it is not altogether obvious that those
persons ought to be the parents of the children. We readily accept
that biological parents lose their obligation to care for their children
when they place them up for adoption, that sperm and egg donors can
waive all responsibility for their biological offspring, and that we have
duties to rescue the children of strangers if they are in peril. Given
this, there are a number of philosophically plausible dependency-care
relationships that one could construct. Children could be raised by
communities with shared duties, by random assignment out of the
hospital, in state daycare facilities, etc.4
This question of who is obligated to care for children is especially
pressing because raising children to adulthood is incredibly difficult.
Even within the range of associative obligations, caring for children
stands out as especially demanding, consuming and life-altering.
Unlike any other associative obligation, parental care seems to be
the least revocable and most likely to undermine one’s own welfare;
a parental obligation could plausibly be interpreted as requiring a
parent to give up her own well-being to the point of extinction for
her child.5 The example that I opened with – of Tutsi rape victims –
surely illustrates such a point. I also mean for the point to apply to
the most ordinary cases of parenthood. While the burden of parenting
ranges from the elite child raised by a governess to something like
the burden taken on by the Tutsi mothers described, the claim here
is just supposed to be that for most people, most of the time, raising
children is extraordinarily demanding. This is, of course, not to say
that it does not come with extraordinary rewards as well. These will
be addressed in the final sections of the article. However, this sense of
4 See Claudia Card, ‘Against Marriage and Motherhood’, Hypatia 11 (1996), pp. 1–23.
See also, Niko Kolodny, ‘Which Relationships Justify Partiality? The Case of Parents and
Children’, Philosophy & Public Affairs 38(1) (2010), pp. 37–75.
5 This may be entirely unreasonable. Yet, those who believe that abortion is
unacceptable even in the case where a mother’s life is at risk hold such a view. Outside
of the question of the morality of abortion, it is probably not uncommon to think that a
parent ought to give her own life if forced to choose between herself and her child.
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the enormity of the parental obligation should be kept in mind as we
consider arguments that might possibly justify it.
Before considering arguments in favor of parental obligations, let’s
look at an objection to associative obligations broadly construed – the
distributive objection – and an application of it to parental obligations in
particular. The distributive objection is just that associative obligations
purport to entitle us to distribute our resources in ways that are
unfair to those not in some such special relationship. Samuel Scheffler
helpfully explains it as follows:
Suppose, for example, that there are three individuals, A, B, and C, none of
whom has any special tie or relationship to any of the others. Each has only
general duties toward the others, which is to say that each’s duties toward the
others are distributed equally . . . Now, however, suppose that A and B, acting
independently of each other, become members of some group of a kind that
is ordinarily thought to give rise to associative duties. And suppose that C is
not a member of this group . . . A and B are now required to give each other’s
interests priority over the interests of C in a wide range of contexts.6
The distributive objection is that group membership works to the
disadvantage of those not in the group. There are certainly ways in
which the distributive objection applies to the family as ‘in group’. The
associative obligations we have toward our family members advantage
those family members and disadvantage all others insofar as being in
a family permits, or even requires, one to distribute one’s resources in
an inegalitarian manner, especially towards one’s children.7 However,
I think there is a variation on the distributive objection that is even
more interesting when applied to parental obligation.
Parental obligation differs from the obligations of friendship in that
it is not requisitely reciprocal. Even if a child dislikes his mother and
does not intend to care for her in return when he is an adult, the
mother still retains her obligation to care for him.8 If the parent were
to aspire to distribute her resources in a truly egalitarian manner, the
maldistribution of resources to her child rather than to herself should be
seen as a significant distributive injustice. The distribution of resources
from parent to child puts the parent in the position of individual C
in Scheffler’s example. In becoming a parent, she loses the right to
6 Stephen Scheffler, Boundaries and Allegiances (Oxford, 2001), pp. 56–7.
7 These questions have been thoughtfully addressed by Harry Brighouse and Adam
Swift, ‘Legitimate Parental Partiality’, Philosophy & Public Affairs 37 (2009), pp. 43–80,
and by Kolodny, ‘Which Relationships Justify Partiality?’.
8 This is compatible with thinking that we have filial obligations. It is just to say
that a parent is prima facie obligated to care for her child independently of whether
the child will meet his own filial obligations. Further, the care is largely temporally and
epistemically distinct; the parent must provide the care without knowing how she will
be cared for in the future.
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distribute resources equitably to herself. Framing it this way puts a
new spin on a classic problem of distributive justice: rather than casting
parental obligations as a conflict in resource allocation between adult
parents, or between one’s children and the children of others, we can
cast it as a conflict in resource allocation between parent and child.
Bringing these points together, there are two desiderata for a
justification of parental obligation: (i) that it is strong enough to live up
to the cost of the obligation itself (where this cost is weighed against the
potential benefits); and (ii) that it rectifies the distributive imbalance
between parents and their own children. What argument can do this?
Here are four reasons for assuming that parents have an associative
obligation both to be partial to their children and to provide long-term
care and nurturance to their children even in the face of the distributive
objection. I will come to reject the first three as insufficient and to
endorse the fourth, despite some misgivings.
Option 1: parenting as a substantive life project
In Law’s Empire, Dworkin describes four criteria that must be met
in order for an associative obligation to stand in absence of its
explicit acceptance: (i) a group must regard its obligations as special
to the group’s members; (ii) a group must regard its obligations
as personal between the group’s members; (iii) a group’s members
must see its obligations as stemming from personal concern for one
member over another; and, (iv) a group’s members must suppose
that a member’s personal concern for another is an equal concern
for all members.9 Parental obligation clearly falls under associative
obligations as described – at least some of the time. Certainly all
four conditions are met in some families; some parents have come to
value parenting as a substantive life project, but not all. And some
have developed these relationships or adopted these projects, but not
sufficiently to meet the sacrifice involved in caring for children. With
little reflection it may be assumed that parenting is a natural or
intrinsically rewarding life project for adults, and indeed for many it
is. But, it is not difficult to recognize the limits of this assumption.
The concern is that grounding parental obligation in the adoption
of parenting as a substantive life project is grossly insufficient to
ensure the care of dependent children. Reproduction is relatively easy;
it is usually easier than nurturing a friendship, fostering community
between neighbors or serving one’s country out of a patriotic sense of
obligation. The process of reproduction outstrips and is independent
of the adoption of parenting as a substantive life project. Ensuring
the care of dependent children cannot rely on a coincidence between
9 Dworkin, Law’s Empire, pp. 199–200.
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parental affection and a child’s need. Further, there is considerable
evidence that not all parents regard their obligation as meaningful
to them in the appropriate way or to the necessary degree. For these
reasons, this option is insufficient to ground parental obligation. Below,
I will also argue that it is not necessary either.10
Option 2: parenting as mere biological relation
If the goal is to establish a broad account under which all, or even
most, parents have an obligation to care for their children, then we
need to establish that a parent has a special obligation to her children
regardless of whether Dworkin’s conditions hold in her particular case.
In order to do this, we could invoke the distinction between ‘bare’
and ‘substantive’ obligation11 and claim that the biological connection
between parent and child is ‘bare’ but still obligating.
The idea that the mere biological fact of relation is enough to motivate
some sort of special obligation is dubious but still interesting in the
case of parent–child relationships. Consider how you might feel if you
discover that you have a living biological father whom you did not know
you had (or that the father you thought was biologically related to you
is in fact not). The discovery of a parent to whom you are biologically
related can be a curious and welcome discovery, but it’s doubtful that
it creates a genuine obligation to that person. If your biological father
were suddenly to appear in your adult life, claim that he is suffering
from an ailment, and claim that you are morally obligated to care for
him, you could rightly reject his claim.12 On the other hand, consider
how you might feel if you were to discover that there is a young child,
who is biologically your child, about whom you did not know. If this
child were to claim that he is suffering from an ailment, and that you
have a moral obligation to care for him, you would likely treat this claim
differently from that of the long-lost father. Mere biological relation to
a child, it seems, resonates with many people, but is still insufficient to
establish obligation.
10 There is a substantial literature documenting parental (particularly maternal)
ambivalence. As an example, see Adrienne Rich’s influential account of motherhood
(Adrienne Rich, Of Woman Born: Motherhood as Experience and Institution, (New York,
1986), pp. 13–14, 32–3). There is also evidence that parental ambivalence and infanticide
are human universals given certain environmental or cultural conditions. See, Jennifer
Nerissa Davis and Martin Daly, ‘Evolutionary Theory and the Human Family’, The
Quarterly Review of Biology 72 (1997), pp. 407–35, at 430. See also Sarah Blaffer Hrdy,
‘The Past, Present, and Future of the Human Family’, The Tanner Lectures on Human
Values 23 (2002), pp. 57–110.
11 See Lionel McPherson, ‘The Moral Insignificance of “Bare” Personal Reasons’,
Philosophical Studies 110 (2002), pp. 29–47.
12 This is a variation of an example used by McPherson, ‘The Moral Insignificance of
“Bare” Personal Reasons’, esp. p. 38.
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Even if we were to accept obligation for ‘bare’ biological reasons, we
would be hard pressed to accept a description of the obligation that is
as robust as that which is required to care for a child. The extent of
sacrifice and resource allocation that is needed to raise a child goes
far beyond what would be expected of any other associative obligation,
including all of those others for which we might have ‘bare’ reasons,
such as sibling relations or filial relations. A biologically grounded
obligation would also fail to explain the obligations that we readily
assume are waived in the case of adoption, sperm and egg donorship,
and, possibly, in cases of rape. Although a ‘bare’ biologically grounded
obligation would be sweeping in its reach – children would be broadly
covered by their biological parents – it fails to demonstrate that there
is moral content in biological relation. This final point is, perhaps, the
most important. But given that we readily talk as if mere biological
relation matters, morally speaking, this is probably due to the caused
dependency of child on parent.13 This option will be considered next.
Option 3: parenting as caused dependency
In a variation on Option 2, Lionel McPherson has argued that the
biological relation between parents and children provides a substantive
reason for an obligation to care for one’s children. It is worth considering
this claim in its entirety:
Biological parents, being causally responsible for the existence of their children,
presumably inherit a moral responsibility to care adequately for their
dependent children or to see that they are cared for by others. Generally
speaking, parents have basic substantive reasons to give priority to their
children’s interests, reasons tied almost inextricably to biological relation.
These reasons are substantive not because the biological relation in itself gives
rise to them but because parents have brought into the world children who need
care.14
McPherson is a ‘substantivist’, meaning that he thinks any special
obligations we have toward others must be based on having substantive
personal relationships or projects, and not on mere bare or biological
relations. Here he claims that biological parents are automatic
candidates for a substantive obligation because they ‘brought into
the world children who need care’. This initially seems obvious and
13 Intuitively, the bare relation matters more, in terms of obligation, as it goes from
parent to child rather than from child to parent. While I don’t think that an account
of parental obligation and an account of filial obligation should parallel one another (as
will be clear in this article, I think they clearly have different justificatory grounds), I
do think it is telling that we probably wouldn’t regard bare biological relation as a good
enough reason to care for one’s parents. If the bare biological relation is insufficient in
this case, it is likewise insufficient for the case of parental obligation.
14 McPherson, ‘The Moral Insignificance of “Bare” Personal Reasons’, pp. 32–3,
emphasis added.
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plausible. In the footnote to this passage, he excludes what he calls
‘unusual circumstances – e.g., rape, incest, surrogacy, sperm or egg
donorship’.15 This is also a prudent and plausible set of exceptions.
The claim, then, is that in a case of rape, one or both of the parents of
the resulting child would not have a special obligation to care for that
child beyond, say, minimal duties of rescue. This should be extended to
the other unusual circumstances. However, I worry that justifying this
associative obligation in this way does not have the kind of reach one
might anticipate.
Considering what McPherson calls ‘unusual circumstances’, we can
see that they each involve a parent who does not intend to bring a
child into the world who will be cared for by that parent. That is, the
caused dependency in question must be intentional in order for it to
be obligating. Are there situations other than the ones listed in which
the bringing of children into the world is not intentional? This is, of
course, tricky. We may want to include under ‘unusual circumstances’
cases where contraception is used but fails, where no contraception
is available, where safe abortion is not available, or where power
and legal structures are such that parents (typically mothers) have
diminished control over their reproductive lives. But such cases would
no longer be unusual; in fact, they may be the most typical. On the
one hand, we would like to say that willfully engaging in activities that
one knows will bring about a dependent child is enough to create a
long-term obligation to care for that child. And yet, we also know that
reproductive control is complicated beyond clear cases of rape, incest
and the like. This highlights the fact that reproduction is, perhaps,
largely unintentional – at least in the strongest sense of that term.
McPherson is initially unconcerned with the intentions of the
parents; rather, he is principally concerned with the causal relations
between the actions of the parents and the existence of their children.
But then why allow that there are any unusual circumstances? Strictly
speaking, even if a mother is raped she (or at least her body) plays a
causal role in bringing into existence a child who needs care. Of course
it’s absurd to assume that a rape victim has an obligation given this
sense of causation. So the causation McPherson has in mind must have
something to do with the intentions of the parents, and this leaves
open the possibility that there are large numbers of children born
unintentionally. If this is the justification for parental obligation, vast
swaths of parents (typically mothers) worldwide have no substantive
reasons for an obligation (or, perhaps, diminished substantive reasons
for an obligation) to care for their children. For example, legal and
15 McPherson, ‘The Moral Insignificance of “Bare” Personal Reasons’, p. 47.
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safe abortion is unavailable or tightly restricted for a significant
number (perhaps the majority) of women in the world; this is true
of birth control as well. Legal and social structures that create a hostile
environment for women’s reproductive control play a murkier causal
role here, but are nonetheless considerable. In a case where a marriage
is arranged and where there are legal barriers to a spouse owning
property or getting an education or working outside the home, we
might consider that spouse’s determination of family size and structure
limited. In such a case, her causal role in bringing into the world a child
who needs care is arguably mitigated by her relative powerlessness,
and, as such, her obligation toward that child is likewise mitigated.
This claim that parents accrue an obligation to care for their children
because they are causally responsible for the existence of those children
is certainly enough to ground an obligation for some parents. But, the
complexities of reproductive voluntariness, autonomy and control are
enough to cast doubt on many, if not most, cases.16 Other substantive
reasons to care for children may develop over time (e.g. one may
assume the obligation out of love for the child or out of a sense of self-
fulfillment), and bare, or biological, relations remain, but there should
be no assumption of obligation prima facie.
Option 4: parenting as unique ability to help and harm
The case for parental obligation as a species of associative obligation
looks weak. Taking stock, some parents have a ‘bare’ or biological
relation to their children. But this bare relation does not in itself
warrant special obligation given that there is no moral content to
a mere biological relation. More, in terms of life projects, affection
and concern is minimally required for moral content. A parent may,
however, have substantive reasons for having a special obligation to
his child if he meets Dworkin’s conditions (i)–(iv) or he is clearly
causally responsible for his child’s existence and his actions are
appropriately voluntary. If either of these is in doubt, then the source
of his obligation is correspondingly dubious. There is also a distributive
16 How to quantify over this conclusion is an empirical matter that is not easily
resolved. The factors to take into consideration include the circumstances mentioned
above, but also societies where mothers have diminished power in the family structure,
where there are religious or cultural forces constraining a person’s reproductive life,
and perhaps even where a person does not choose her spouse. Each of these factors
mediates the voluntariness of parenthood to different degrees, and they interact with
one another to create complicated constraints on the causal control a parent has over
reproduction. Here, I am making the normative claim that they do in fact diminish a
parent’s obligation toward a child. The further empirical question is how many parents
have such a diminished obligation if the normative claim is correct. My suspicion is that
it will be the majority of mothers worldwide, although not necessarily the majority of all
parents.
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objection to the inegalitarian nature of the parental obligation. If
there is a successful substantive case to be made for parental
obligations, then it has to overcome the hurdle of the distributive
objection as well. So far we have not seen a case that meets this
threshold.
A possibility still to consider is that there could be umbrella reasons
for parental obligations – those that create obligations in almost all
parent–child relationships. Such reasons would have the furthest reach
of all substantive reasons considered thus far. The most promising
tactic for such an umbrella account lies in external descriptions of the
parent–child relationship. For example, if a case could be made that,
ceteris paribus, it is best, externally speaking, for children to be cared
for by their mothers or fathers, then this might count as a substantive
reason for a special obligation. What makes this reason substantive
rather than bare is that, although parents and children have a mere
bare biological relation, this particular biological relation is unique and,
ceteris paribus, superior to all other relations in promoting the well-
being of the child. The parent–child relationship, then, is unlike the
friendship, co-worker, fellow citizen, or even sibling or filial relationship
in this respect. Even if I were to accept that a bare biological relation
with my brother gives me a reason to accord him special obligations,
and even if I were to fail to act accordingly either by caring for him
or ensuring that others care for him in my stead, I have not harmed
him in the way that I would if I failed to meet such an obligation to my
child. The measure of potential harm does not even come close in any
of these other associations. The critical maneuver in this argument is
that obligation is measured by unique ability to harm and help rather
than by either (i) the explicit, reasoned adoption of a commitment, (ii)
mere biological relation, or (iii) caused dependency. This would be a
sweeping defense of parental obligations. It would even include some
of the ‘special circumstances’ discussed above. For example, if it could
be established by means of an external description of the parent–child
relationship that even children born to rape victims are best cared for
by their mothers, then this would create an assumption of parental
obligation that is far-reaching. Again, it is worth emphasizing that this
obligation is created by the interests of the child and not by the interests
of the parent. More on this final point below.
In section II, I provide an external description of the parent–child
relationship. I do so in order to argue that parents are in a unique
position in the lives of children. Most parents, most of the time, are in
the position to help their children by parenting them – more so than
any other caretaker could. They are also in the unique position among
possible caretakers of being able to cause the greatest harm to their
children by not parenting them. In section III of this article, I return
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to a fuller defense of Option 4 once this external description of the
parent–child relationship is on the table.
II. AN EXTERNAL DESCRIPTION OF THE PARENT–CHILD
RELATIONSHIP
The challenge of this section is to provide an external description
of the parent–child relationship that is obligation-generating. The
description should establish that parental care is good for children,
and, importantly, better for children than care from other adults. Once
this is established, two further points need to be brought to bear: first,
that it is obligatory that parents do what is good for their children,
whether or not it is good for the parents themselves to do so, and,
second, that this obligation falls on most parents most of the time.
Here I will argue that, despite the great deal of variability among
human parents, there are clearly identifiable parental behaviors that
optimize the well-being of children. These behaviors are not exclusive
to biological parents; but, by and large, it is predictable that children
will be best off if consistently cared for by biological or adoptive parents
(who have explicitly adopted the commitment). The reader at this point
may think this is so obvious that it is not worth arguing for. However,
it is important to keep in mind the goal: to provide a sweeping defense
of an obligation for parents to care for their children despite the high
costs of doing so, and whether or not the parents are motivated to do
so out of love, or personal reward, or biological relation or because they
voluntarily brought children into the world.
My argument will be relatively simple: (i) parents are in the best
position to optimize the well-being of their children; (ii) those same
parents are in the best position to cause harm to their children by not
attempting to optimize this well-being; and (iii) children are deserving
of moral regard. Therefore, (iv) parents have an obligation to care for
their children even when it is costly, involuntary and unrewarding.
(i) and (ii) are empirical claims, and (iii) is an assumption made (but
undefended) for the purposes of this article. First, I will turn to a brief
(but hopefully persuasive) defense of (i) and (ii). Some of the following
will apply only to mothers, but the majority of it has implications for
all parents: mothers and fathers, adoptive or biological.
From an external perspective, it is in a parent’s interest to provide
nutrition, affection and protection to a child for as little time as
is compatible with thriving such that resources can be diverted to
other children or to the parent herself.17 Beyond this, while there
17 The true analysis of this conflict is much more complicated and may depend on
factors such as the perceived quality of the offspring, whether paternity is shared
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is a great deal of variability among human parents, there are also
clearly identifiable parental behaviors that optimize the well-being
of children.18 We can be confident that consistent parenting by
biological or adoptive parents creates a critically important cycle
of nutrition, protection and affection for children. Again, from an
external perspective, it is most straightforward (although admittedly
oversimplified) to describe this cycle in terms of the hormones prolactin
and oxytocin. Both of these are implicated in the well-being of children
and both of them are critical in the cycle of care that optimizes this well-
being. While we are likely to identify these hormones with biological
mothers (and this is not unreasonable), the physical, hormonal changes
that compel most parents to provide extraordinary care for their
children are evident in mothers, fathers and adoptive parents.
Despite its name, prolactin is a multi-purpose hormone that shows
up across animal species, even in animals that are not mammals.
While it causes females to lactate, it is also more broadly associated
with parenting.19 Among primates, prolactin levels increase right after
the birth of a child for both mothers and fathers. After birth, higher
prolactin levels are associated with a stronger desire to protect babies
from harm; this appears to be true across species. There is a cycle here:
the more nurturing caretakers are, the more their pituitary glands
produce prolactin. This may be one of the ways in which the human
infant encourages adults to parent him.20
Another hormone implicated in this cycle of parenting is the more
mammalian-specific oxytocin. A suckling baby stimulates her mother
to produce oxytocin, which is then released in the milk back to the baby.
The effect is that both mother and baby are mildly sedated and intimacy
between them is promoted.21 The interaction between pregnancy
and postpartum hormones generated in the parent–child relationship
between offspring, the needs of other children (e.g. how close they are in age), and
possible conflicts in genetic expression between both genetic parents. See Robert
Trivers, ‘Parent–Offspring Conflict’, American Zoologist 14 (1974), pp. 249–64; D. Haig,
‘Placental Hormones, Genomic Imprinting, and Maternal-Fetal Communication’, Journal
of Evolutionary Biology 9 (1996), pp. 357–80.
18 Unlike other animals, humans are not uniform in our care of children. We don’t
always gobble up the placenta, lick our babies, or build nests. Unlike many other
primates, we sometimes abandon our sick or disabled babies, and we don’t always protect
them from abuse by unrelated adults. We don’t always choose to care for them in difficult
environmental conditions, and we don’t always mourn their deaths. We also differ from
most other primates in that we sometimes space our babies too close together, accepting
that some of them will die.
19 For much of this section I am indebted to the research and accompanying scholarship
of Sarah Blaffer Hrdy. In particular, see Mother Nature (New York, 1999) and references
therein.
20 Hrdy, Mother Nature, p. 131.
21 Hrdy, Mother Nature, pp. 138–9.
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creates the conditions for survival, nurturance and protection in the
early years of a child’s life. Throughout history (particularly in pre-
industrialized societies) and across the species, it is proximity to a
lactating mother with support from other related adults that is the
best predictor of early childhood well-being.
The parental behaviors that children ought to regard as best are those
that optimize nutrition, the certainty and constancy of affection and
protection from dangerous situations. These three behaviors are often
connected: the more prolactin produced by a parent, the more protective
that parent is of a child; prolactin is also what stimulates lactation,
and as suckling continues, oxytocin is produced and shared, sustaining
the bonds of affection between parent and child and giving the parent
an increasing desire to sustain and protect the child as the days go
by. There are, of course, a number of routes to achieving this cycle of
nutrition, affection and protection other than gestating and birthing
babies. Without the immediate bodily and hormonal transformations
of pregnancy, childbirth and lactation, males and females of many
species can develop all of these behaviors along with the accompanying
hormones that sustain the cycle.22
There is more to nursing babies than survival, nutrition, protection
and affection. It is unarguable at this point in medical science that
babies that are nursed enjoy a wide range of long-term benefits. These
benefits include immunities to a host of childhood diseases, long-term
health outlook, increased intelligence (under certain genetic conditions)
and academic ability, and improved psychomotor and developmental
skills.23 The benefits to children (and the adults they will become)
22 Hrdy shares the following stark anecdote about rats: ‘A virgin female rat . . . will
either ignore or devour a pup she happens upon. But if she is repeatedly exposed to pups,
this inexperienced “au pair from hell” becomes quite nurturing – without undergoing
the hormone changes specific to pregnancy. When experimenters place pups in her cage
again and again, eventually she stops killing and begins to care for them . . . In a now
classic experiment, blood from a rat who had just given birth was injected into a virgin
female. The transfusion caused a dramatic reduction in the amount of time it took this
virgin to retrieve babies. Within fifteen hours, virgin females spontaneously gathered up
babies without requiring long, often gory, prior exposure’ (Hrdy, Mother Nature, p. 151).
23 The medical literature on this topic has grown considerably in recent years. See
Avshalom Caspi et al., ‘Moderation of Breastfeeding Effects on the IQ by Genetic
Variation in Fatty Acid Metabolism’, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
104 (2007), pp. 18860–5; A. S. Cunningham, ‘Breastfeeding: Adaptive Behavior for Child
Health and Longevity’, Breastfeeding: Biocultural Perspectives, ed. P. Stuart-Macadam
and K. A. Detwyler (New York, 1995), pp. 243–63; L. J. Horwood et al., ‘Breast Milk
Feeding and Cognitive Ability at 7–8 Years’, Archives of Disease in Childhood: Fetal
and Neonatal Edition 84 (2001), pp. F23–F27; T. W. McDade and C. M. Worthman, ‘The
Weanling’s Dilemma Reconsidered: A Biocultural Analysis of Breastfeeding Ecology’,
Journal of Developmental Behavioral Pediatrics 19 (1998), pp. 286–99; P. C. Lee, ‘The
Meanings of Weaning: Growth, Lactation, and Life History’, Evolutionary Anthropology
5 (1996), pp. 87–9; W. H. Oddy, ‘Breastfeeding Protects Against Illness and Infection
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of prolonged breastfeeding are not in doubt. But the burdens on the
resources and activities of the nursing mother are significant; and,
age at weaning can be predicted along a nexus of environmental and
socio-economic conditions. Mothers who work outside of the home are
likely to wean early; mothers who have support with housework from
spouses, older children, or relatives are likely to wean later, etc.24
Beyond the early years of the lives of children parents remain integral
to their well-being. There is evidence that parental affection throughout
childhood mediates a child’s response to harsh conditions (such as
punishment) and promotes academic achievement.25 These effects do
not appear to be tied to biological parents and are replicated in adoptive
parents as well. Whether these results could be reproduced on the
basis of warmth from other adults in a child’s community seems to be
a further stretch of the original implications, and not evident in the
research. Similarly, there is evidence that emotional bonds (like love)
are part of what tie families together into cooperative networks. These
cooperative networks appear to be crucial for the success of the child;
it is affection between family members that structures the cooperative
network crucial to a child’s well-being.26
Thus far, I have been describing parental behaviors that optimize a
child’s well-being. The description is meant to support the idea that
children are best cared for by their parents rather than under some
other possible social scheme. While there are undoubtedly benefits
that accrue to children by having those parents be biologically related
to them (e.g. the ease of lactation, or powerful hormonal changes),
it certainly is not necessary to optimize well-being for all children.
Further, it is reasonable to suppose that there is no natural family
structure among humans; history and cross-cultural studies show us
that families are constructed in all sorts of ways. Although this seems
correct, this is not to say that there is not a disposition to structure
in Infants and Children: A Review of the Evidence’, Breastfeeding Review 9 (2001),
pp. 11–18; Robert Quinlan, Marsha Quinlan, and Mark Flinn, ‘Parental Investment
and Age at Weaning in a Caribbean Village’, Evolution and Human Behavior 24 (2003),
pp. 1–16; D. W. Sellen, ‘Comparison of Infant Feeding Patterns Reported for Nonindustrial
Populations With Current Recommendations’, Journal of Nutrition 131 (2001), pp. 2707–
15; M. Vestergaard et al., ‘Duration of Breastfeeding and Developmental Milestones
during the Latter Half of Infancy’, Acta Paediatrica 88 (1999), pp. 1327–32.
24 See Quinlan, Quinlan, and Flinn, ‘Parental Investment and Age of Weaning in a
Caribbean Village’.
25 See K. Deater-Deckard et al., ‘Maternal Warmth Moderates the Link Between
Physical Punishment and Child Externalizing Problems: A Parent-Offspring Behavior
Genetic Analysis’, Parenting: Science and Practice 6 (2006), pp. 59–78. See also,
S. D. Simpkins et al., ‘Mother–Child Relationship as a Moderator of the Relationship
between Family Educational Involvement and Child Achievement’, Parenting: Science
and Practice 6 (2006), pp. 49–57.
26 See, Davis and Daly, ‘Evolutionary Theory and the Human Family’.
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families in ways that tend to promote the well-being of the children
in those families. These dispositions are not always easy to recognize
because they often clash with cultural or religious expectations and
adapt to environmental circumstances. For example, in many cases,
children are best off when raised by a network of caregivers at
the center of which is the primary caregiver (typically the lactating
mother). In other cases, children are best off in situations of paternal
uncertainty that promote support from multiple fathers.27
Humans, like some primates, are unusual among animals in that
we readily care for children with whom we have no biological
relationship.28 However, we predictively provide that care in nepotistic
ways when we have no biological children of our own. The tendency
among human parents is to provide care for unrelated children only
when we have already successfully reproduced, and only when the
care is reciprocal. We tend to be less reliable caretakers of children
when neither of these situations hold (i.e. there are no related children
for us to care for, and we receive no return for our care of unrelated
children). Humans are also like other primates in that the stability
of our family structure tends to deteriorate with the introduction of
unrelated adults.29 This appears to be universal across cultures. Again,
the evidence is not that children will necessarily experience such stress
or instability, or even that this is caused by the family composition as
opposed to being merely correlated with it. The point here is merely
to conclude reasonably that – given that children need care by some
adult for long periods of time – that care is best provided by parents of
children. Without such care by one’s parents, the likelihood of harm
to most children is immorally high.30 When parents abrogate the
27 See Hrdy, Mother Nature and Mothers and Others: The Evolutionary Origins of
Human Understanding (Cambridge, 2009) and references therein.
28 There are exceptions among other animals (e.g. an adult dog raising a litter of
kittens), but these are true exceptions and are in no way typical of the species. However,
the issue of how it is that social animals may help unrelated members of their own species
or members of another species is a complicated one; Hrdy’s Mothers and Others provides
an introduction to some of the research and literature on this topic.
29 On this see: M. Daly and M. Wilson, ‘Violence against Stepchildren’, Current
Directions in Psychological Science 5 (1996), pp. 77–81. There is research to suggest
that stepfamilies are less stable with each child that is not biologically related to the
parent, and more stable with each child that is. More to the point, there is a body of
cross-cultural evidence that suggests that stepparents tend to invest in stepchildren
less than in biologically related children. Correlatively, child abuse and – in the rare
cases in which this occurs – the murder of a child are far more likely to be perpetrated by
stepparents. Davis and Daly, ‘Evolutionary Theory and the Human Family’, and reference
therein.
30 There is also reason to believe that children who live with stepparents, distant
relatives, or non-relatives are more likely to experience stress and a depressed immune
system. Mark Flinn and Barry England, ‘Childhood Stress: Endocrine and Immune
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obligation to provide this care, the consequences can be quite dire for
the children involved.31
The purpose of presenting such claims is simply to provide a cursory,
but still plausible, external description of the parent–child relationship,
and the conditions that predictively promote childhood well-being, that
could serve as an umbrella reason for parental obligations if, ceteris
paribus, it is best for children to be cared for by their parents. This
maintains intact what is surely the case: that some children some of
the time are in fact best off in a range of different family structures, but
not in communities with no family structure at all, or where certain
adults have no strong obligations to care for them.
III. AN ACCOUNT OF PARENTAL OBLIGATION
I have offered several cases for parental obligation. In one such case,
obligation is created by developing substantive relationships with
one’s children or adopting parenting as a life project. I argued that
this is unsatisfactory as a broad motivation for parental obligation
because of the lack of fit between the burden of the obligation and the
substantive relationships required to generate it. In another plausible
case, obligation is created by playing a causal role in bringing a
child into the world. That account of parental obligation creates fewer
obligations to fewer children than is commonly supposed. If these are
the only defenses of parental obligation, then parents as a group have
a level of obligation that is relatively low – certainly less than the
common-sense expectation.
However, there is still room for a far-reaching account of parental
obligation that is created by an external description of what is best for
children. This case for obligation is insensitive to whether the parent
Responses to Psychosocial Events’, in Social & Cultural Lives of Immune Systems, ed.
J. M. Wilce (London, 2003), pp. 107–47.
31 Large-scale experiments with wet-nursing as in eighteenth-century France were
particularly disastrous and lethal to the babies involved. The social complexities of
Europe during this period led to extremely high levels of wet-nursing and the sending
of children to foundling homes despite the known risks involved (90 per cent of children
failing to survive in some cases). Some have read the history of this period in Europe as
well as other cases of endemic child abandonment as clear evidence that maternal love,
instinct and affection are not universals, and that they are instead social constructions, or
patriarchal impositions. I think this is probably the wrong way to interpret these periods
in history. Maternal responses in these cases were probably exceptional responses to the
social and environmental constraints of the time. However, terms such as ‘maternal love’
and ‘maternal instinct’ are worthlessly vague. I do not rely on them in this article. See
Hrdy, Mother Nature; David Kertzer, Sacrificed for Honor: Italian Infant Abandonment
and the Politics of Reproductive Control (Boston, 1993); Richard Trexler, ‘The Foundlings
of Florence’, History of Childhood Quarterly 1 (1973), pp. 259–84; John Boswell, The
Kindness of Strangers: The Abandonment of Children in Western Europe from Late
Antiquity to the Renaissance (New York, 1988).
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is responsible for her child’s existence or whether she cares about the
child to the degree necessary to nurture it through childhood; rather,
this case is predominantly concerned with the well-being of children,
and how an account of that well-being creates an obligation on the part
of the parent. The well-being of children would have to outweigh the
cost to the parents – this is the next and necessary step of the argument.
I have not endeavored to provide a complete account of the tasks of
parenthood, but even the little that has been mentioned here produces
a wide network of constraints on the activities of parents and the
distribution of time and resources within a family unit. That which
produces the best outcome for a child requires that parents structure
years of their lives around providing goods and services to children or
constructing ways in which their care can be mimicked. This sacrifice
on the part of parents is considerable (and it will be addressed further
in the next section), but it seems plausible that the cost of parents as
a group not making such sacrifices would deprive parents and children
of substantial benefit and cause substantial harm.
Thus far I have focused on the helping and harming that are
implicated in parental care; however, the calculation of the obligation
created by parental behavior should not neglect the benefit that might
accrue to parents by fulfilling parental obligations, or harm that might
accrue by neglecting them. It is unarguably the case that, for many
parents, parenthood is a supremely valuable association; it is the most
important association in the lives of many adults. Parenting children
under this description could be something that provides deep meaning
to a parent’s life, something that fulfills her desire to care for those
whom she loves and that structures the decisions of her life – including,
perhaps, divisions of resources that are wildly unfair to the parent
herself. It has been important for the argument of this article that
there are parental obligations even if parents do not explicitly adopt
them by either voluntarily bringing children into the world who need
care, or incorporating the project of parenting into their own account
of well-being. However, a final calculation of parental obligation should
take into account the potential for benefitting both the child and the
parent. As such, the emotional and personal rewards of parenthood are
added to, but independent of, the benefits to children.
Once we accept that the benefits of parental care to children outweigh
the costs to parents, we are in a position to accept that a moral
regard for the well-being of children (and the adults they become)
is enough to bite the distributive bullet. It is indisputable that the
distribution of goods toward children and away from parents is subject
to the distributive objection against any case for a parental associative
obligation. However, it seems morally justified simply to accept that
parental care is distributively unfair, but maintain that it is not unjust.
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Children need care. Parents are, ceteris paribus, in the best position to
provide that care. This is a substantive external fact about the parent–
child relationship; it is a moral fact that children are deserving of well-
being. The conclusion is that parents, as a rule, incur an obligation to
provide that care.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIAL POLICY
In this article, I have made a case for parental obligation with a
broad reach. The motivation for this argument has been to look at this
obligation from the perspective of children and what might constitute
their well-being. If it were the case that the well-being of very young
children is ceteris paribus optimized in proximity to their parents, then
what would change if social systems were organized in such a way as to
prioritize the well-being of children? Perhaps communities would divert
resources to the parents of young children, and would recognize that the
extent to which a parent is a means to the well-being of her children
is the extent to which it is a community’s obligation to compensate
her for that. Another way of approaching this is to recognize that the
distribution of goods between parent and child can be unfair but just;
in order to bring the fairness in line with the justness, we ought, as a
society, to compensate parents for this unfair distribution.
Unfortunately, my conclusions must remain at a high level of
abstraction. My focus here has been on parental obligation simpliciter
with limited discussion of the content of that obligation. For instance,
the content of this obligation might be that parents are responsible
for providing nutrition, protection and education to their children, but
not a nice car, or a first-rate university education. It might also limit
parents only to provide such goods to their children as is compatible
with fairly aiding the children of strangers. With such content in hand,
it would be possible to formulate genuine political goals. While I think
there is an interesting discussion to be had, that has not been my
principal focus here.
One might object that dependent children are brought into this world
in all sorts of ways, including the straightforward way described by
McPherson above. That is, some parents intend to bring children into
the world and cause this to happen in a robustly intentional way. And
some parents have adopted parenting as a substantial, meaningful
life project central to their conception of their own well-being. Should
such parents be regarded as suffering from an unfair distribution? No,
probably not. So then, from a social policy perspective a fair society
has two broad choices: It must either (i) eliminate all barriers to
reproductive autonomy, or (ii) create schemes of compensation for the
unfair burden taken on by parents. Ideally, it would do both. After
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all, creating conditions of total reproductive autonomy would slowly
eliminate the need for such compensation. Given that (i) is ideal but
probably unattainable, serious philosophical consideration ought to be
given to the costs of parental obligation qua associative obligation and
why a moral society ought to take these seriously.
So, is the solution to advocate on behalf of extending the period of
leave with job security? Is it to provide better child-care options so as
to optimize the well-being of children while allowing their parents to
delegate their care to others? Is it to recognize the birth of children due
to rapes committed during wartime as a further, long-term cost of war
deserving of treatment in a war crimes tribunal? There will be many
such social considerations that result from a rethinking of parental
obligation. It is beyond the scope of this article to draft nuanced social
policy. Rather, my aim is only to propose that societies are fairer when
they are able to provide adequate justification for parental obligation,
when they recognize the inherent distributive conflict between parent
and child, and when they promote compensatory schemes to remedy
the cost of parental associations.32
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32 I would like to acknowledge the assistance of the editors of this journal and two
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